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In October of 2003, then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wrote a memo to his top 
advisers asking how we would know whether the US was winning the Global War on 
Terror.  This question may have been mis-timed but it was perfectly appropriate.  In this 
paper, I use the framework of cost-benefit analysis to identify some of the issues that 
would need to be addressed in order to answer Rumsfeld’s question.  The most difficult 
issue is that there is no accepted definition as to what constitutes victory, or success, so 
there is no way to identify the ultimate benefits.  Available evidence does suggest that 
while there are numerous identifiable sources of costs, it is far less clear where the 
benefits are located.  The conclusion, necessarily qualitative in nature, is that the costs 
have been many and the benefits few.  
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Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror?...  Today, we lack metrics to 
know….  Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day 
than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against 





On October 16, 2003, two years after 9/11 and six months after the US achieved its 
primary objective in the War in Iraq by deposing Saddam Hussein, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld sent a short memo to the Department’s senior leadership, Generals 
Richard Myers and Peter Pace, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Douglas Feith.  The memo contained a series of direct questions, 16 in all, mostly 
inquiring whether the US had adopted an appropriate strategy in its war on terror, 
whether US political and military institutions were appropriate for the tasks, and how 
would US leaders “know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror.”2. 
 
 The memo was leaked to the press and was widely criticized, and even ridiculed.  
Two years into the war on terror and six months into the War in Iraq seemed a bit late to 
be asking how we would know if we were winning.  Such a criticism, however, obscures 
a more important point:  Rumsfeld’s questions were entirely appropriate, even if the 
timing was not.  Wars require the extensive deployment of economic resources and since 
resources are scarce with alternative uses, decision-makers need to evaluate how best to 
use them in order to achieve their objectives.  Thus, there must be some way to measure, 
or at least generally evaluate, the value of the resources deployed and the scope of the 
                                                 




expected benefits.  In Rumsfeld’s language, we need metrics to define and measure 
success and metrics to measure costs. 
 
 In the case of large wars, such as World War II, the anticipated benefits were so 
widely accepted and perceived to be so large that questions of aggregate efficiency were 
not high on the agenda.  Later, attempts were made both in the private sector, such as at 
the RAND Corporation, and in the Pentagon, especially under Defense Secretary Robert 
MacNamara, to develop techniques and data to measure the effectiveness of specific 
defense programs (Enthoven and Smith, 1971). 
 
 What I would like to do in this paper is describe some of the issues that must be 
confronted in order to present an evaluation of US policy in what has become the primary 






Calculating federal government expenditures for the main components of the GWOT is 
relatively straightforward, the main issue being identifying what activities of the 
government are directed towards the primary objective of combating terrorism (Belasco, 
2007; Kosiak, 2007; Walker, 2006).  The bulk of the expenditures to date have been for 
military activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with other activities of the Defense and 
State Departments, Homeland Security and the intelligence agencies.  Less obvious are 
outlays of state and local governments, some of which may be funded by federal grants, 
and outlays of private companies, individuals, and other entities, as they take actions they 








There are additional expenditures that are either committed for future years, are highly 
likely to be undertaken, or follow from present actions.  The costs of replacing military 
equipment destroyed in combat, and of procuring greater quantities of equipment that 
proved to be in short supply, was not included in budgetary projections for a number of 
years.  In the latter category, for example, are projected health-related outlays of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs based upon injuries sustained by members of the armed 
forces who serviced in combat zones (Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2006; Bilmes, 2007).  There 
will be similar private expenditures given the large numbers of civilians employed by 
contractors and private military corporations who also function in combat zones. 
 
Secondary Outlays and Incentive Effects 
 
Some costs occur because actions taken in the GWOT affect a range of non-GWOT 
activities.  Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006), for example, suggest that 20 to 40 per cent of the 
increase in world oil prices since early 2003 has been the result of an increase in 
perceived risk due to the war in Iraq, combined with a reduction in anticipated production 
from Iraq’s oil fields.  In another example, one analysis suggested that tighter border 
restrictions would raise the costs of international trade sufficiently to offset the gains 
from tariff reduction in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (Lenain et al, 2002). 
 
Costs such as these can also have important disincentive effects.  Raising the price 
of oil or the cost, in both outlays and time, of moving goods is equivalent to imposing a 
tax on the relevant activities (Kelleher, 2002).  The price is higher but the quantity 
supplied stays the same.  Unless this “tax” is offset by some other efficiency enhancing 
measures, the higher costs will lead to a reduction in the amount demanded, reduced 
output and, in the case of oil, a shift of purchasing power from buyers to sellers. 
 
Another source of costs and possible negative incentives is the expansion of the 
national security bureaucracy and resulting instances of waste, inefficient decision-
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making, fraud and distorted incentives.  The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, the 
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security have been heavily 
criticized by government investigators, including the Government Accountability Office 
and various departmental inspectors general, by private institutions and individuals, and 
by members of Congress, for severe management deficiencies with respect to GWOT 
activities.3  With the shift in control of Congressional committees in January 2007, there 
is likely to be increased Congressional oversight of costly activities.  With increased 
emphasis on and funding for GWOT related activities, there have also been negative 
aspects of incentive effects.  In one example, the Justice Department has reportedly been 
inflating its statistics of terrorist-related arrests and prosecutions, by including instances 
involving narcotics smuggling and immigration fraud, among others (Eggen, 2007).  If 
these allegations are substantiated, presumably they would be attributed to the standard 
bureaucratic response of increasing one’s visibility in an area of increased interest and 




A significant imputed cost is the lost output due to death and injury, both physical and 
emotional, from combat operations, and a shift in individual activity from civilian to 
military through the mobilization of National Guard and Reserve units.  Since many 
military personnel are young, the loss of output over their projected actuarial lifetimes 
can be substantial (Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2006).  As an example of the mobilization effect, 
the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi were hampered during the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster as local National Guard units were severely understaffed due to Iraq War related 
mobilization. 
 
Another area of imputed costs can be found in the effects of political changes 
brought about as part of, or in response to, the GWOT.  Many have argued that 
restrictions in the Patriot Act and the Military Commissions Act are damaging to US 
                                                 
3 For one prominent example, see the web site of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR), www.sigir.mil.  
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traditions of due process.  The US standing outside of its borders appears to have been 
severely damaged as a result of GWOT activities, most prominently the War in Iraq and 
the detentions at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo (Regan, 2007).  Such damage, of course, 
can be mitigated or reversed, depending on changed circumstance or shifts in a country’s 
perceptions of its self interest.  And while actions such as these are hard, if not 





Opportunity costs are usually considered an alternative to expenditures as a means of 
measuring the costs of an activity.  They need to be identified partly because they can 
differ from measured costs, and partly because they highlight the importance of 
considering alternatives.  There are three general categories of opportunity costs: 
 
First, increased expenditures for the GWOT may come at the expense of 
consumption expenditures, the classic guns-butter trade-off.  The form this takes, and the 
specific categories of consumption most affected, will heavily depend on how GWOT 
outlays are financed.  Reducing consumption expenditures, while locating where the 
costs occur and contributing to changes in public perceptions of well being, are not going 
to add much to the analysis of the costs of fighting terror beyond the dollar measures 
already discussed. 
 
Second, GWOT expenditures could come at the expense of outlays for 
investment, including business fixed investment, residential construction, infrastructure, 
public and private expenditures on health and education, the primary human capital 
categories, and research and development.  Reducing outlays in these categories could 
have a negative effect on future economic growth, so that the dollar cost measured this 
way can be higher than the dollar value of the funds shifted to the GWOT, since the 
present value of future lost output would need to be included. 
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As an example, research by Kevin Murphy and Robert Topel has sought to 
identify and provide estimates of the aggregate benefits from medical research 
specifically, and improved health and longevity in general.  Many of the benefits are 
implicit and not subject to market valuation.  If they were valued, Murphy and Topel 
estimate that their contribution to national wealth, which they call “health capital”, would 
be “extremely large” and “that the economic value of these gains are enormous” (Murphy 
and Topel, 1999, p. 2).  Reducing the growth of health-related expenditures as a means of 
funding the GWOT could have very large negative effects on future living standards.   
 
Third, current and projected GWOT expenditures are derived from a particular set 
of activities.  Alternatives are available and have been argued for.  Thus, reducing 
GWOT outlays on current activities may not free funds for consumption and investment, 
but instead, may lead to alternative policies for dealing with terrorist threats.  In one 
example, an alternative to invading Iraq was the continuation of containment and a larger 
anti-terrorism effort in post-Taliban Afghanistan.  The relevant cost-benefit calculation 
would need to compare the actual policy – invasion and regime change in Iraq and its 
aftermath – with the most likely alternatives – continuation of containment of the Saddam 
Hussein regime and a larger US presence in Afghanistan (Davis et al, 2003; 2006; Bilmes 




Another aspect of assessing costs is to analyze the effects of how the GWOT is 
being financed.  The opportunity costs discussed above are also forms of financing.  
Military personnel and equipment have been re-allocated from other security-related 
tasks to the GWOT.  Personnel, equipment and funds have also been shifted to the Coast 
Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the various intelligence gathering agencies, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the agencies that have been combined into 
the Transportation Safety Administration, and other parts of the federal government, and 
to some extent, state and local governments. 
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Mostly, however, the GWOT has been financed through deficit spending.  There 
has not been extensive monetization of the debt, as occurred, for example, during the 
Vietnam War, as the US has been successful in selling debt on international markets.  So 
far, the US has avoided the inflationary pressures and interest rate rises that have 
accompanied other wars.  There were a series of federal tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, 
without any tax increases after the 9/11 attacks, or during the War in Iraq.  This is the 
first time in United States history that a major set of national security activities have been 




Assessing, and possibly measuring, the benefits from the GWOT require defining what 
they are.  At the most general level of enhanced security, they are difficult if not 
impossible to measure.  Security is the classic example of a public good, which by its 
definition -- the inability to supply the optimal amount via the market -- implies there is 
no market measure of what value society places on this activity.  Indeed, the only 
measure of national defense that we have is the defense budget.  But the defense budget 
only measures the cost of producing the goods and services that are utilized, with the 
implicit assumption that there are no productivity gains within this particular production 
process, and no measure of demand.  Thus, cost is the only measure of the value of the 
service provided. 
 
Wars are usually fought with a broad security objective, but with specific tactical 
objectives in terms of securing territory and protecting against an enemy.  Success in war 
is often defined in terms of gaining territory, repulsing attack, defeating opposition 
forces, destroying or weakening an enemy’s war making capacities and, ultimately, 
forcing a cessation of hostilities, possibly to the point of surrender.  In most previous US 
wars there was a clear metric of success or failure, a surrender by the opposition 
(Revolutionary War, Civil War, Spanish American War, the two World Wars), an agreed 
truce (Korean War), the removal of US military and political operations (Vietnam War), 
or the clear dominance of the allied military forces and the imposition of terms (Gulf 
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War).  The ending of these wars was often accompanied by popular images, such as 
Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown, Lee handing his sword to Grant at Appomattox, the 
World War I armistice at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month in 
1918, Emperor Hirohito in formal attire surrendering to General MacArthur on the deck 
of the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, and even the evacuation of the US embassy in 
Saigon in 1975. 
 
But how will anyone know when the GWOT has come to a conclusion?  The War 
in Iraq achieved a traditional milestone, the deposing of a government, in short order, but 
has continued for four years.  In the case of global terror, who will surrender, admit 
defeat, or withdraw?  Terror is not a government, an ideology or a political movement; it 
is a tactic used in a wide range of specific situations.  The war metaphor appears to be 
counter-productive in attempting to assess the success or failure of government policies 
(Roberts, 2005; Regan, 2006). 
 
An alternative, which the US government has rejected, is to see the fight against 
terrorist threats as having conceptual similarity to the fight against serious criminal 
activities.  While citizens and political leaders would like to see crime reduced as much 
as possible, no one seriously expects crime to disappear and people, through their 
collective behavior, appear willing to accept a reasonably low level of criminal activity.  
The costs that would need to be incurred to reduce crime to near zero, such as removing 
many civil protections and vastly increasing expenditures on police and detention, are 
unlikely to be enacted.  Terrorist tactics have been used for millennia and are not likely to 
disappear.  Thus, the real question may be what level of terrorist threat is acceptable and 
would constitute a “victory” in the GWOT?  
 
The Terrorist Threat4 
 
One clear benefit would be to end, or reduce to acceptable levels, the threat from 
terrorism.  Acts of terrorism impose economic costs and alter behavior as people adjust 
                                                 
4 For an analysis of research on the costs of terrorism, see Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer, 2007. 
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when their perceptions of threat change.  Thus, the economic damage to New York from 
the 9/11 attacks was compounded by a subsequent decline in tourism and a heightened 
exodus of business from the city.  But while these costs were immense for those most 
directly affected, in the aggregate they were not large, and over a relatively short period 
of time, the city and regional economy has largely resumed the growth patterns that were 
present prior to the attack (Chernick 2005).  Of course, the 9/11 attacks have been, up to 
now, a one-time event.  Repetitive terrorist incidents may well have larger and longer 
lasting relative economic costs, raising the potential benefits if such attacks can be 
reduced or even stopped.  Looking solely at economic costs from an act of terrorism and 
defining success as the absence of additional attacks, it is possible to obtain estimates that 
suggest the benefits from the GWOT have exceeded the costs (Zycher, 2003).  But this 
seems an incomplete way of measuring both costs and benefits.  
 
Terrorist Activities  
 
One broad measure of success is that the United States has not been attacked since 
September 11, 2001, in part because of the effectiveness of elements of the GWOT in 
disrupting some terrorist activities.  But since this war has been defined as a global war 
on terror, this is an incomplete measure.  Major terrorism incidents in Madrid, London, 
Bali, Egypt, Thailand, and other locations, as well as the ongoing violence in Iraq, are 
suggestive of the continued presence of a global threat.  Indeed, some research has 
suggested that the practice of terrorism is subject to incentives and constraints similar to  
the market and non-market behavior usually studied by economists (Enders and Sandler, 
1993).  If US policies toward homeland security have been effective in deterring further 
attacks, thereby raising the costs to terrorists of carrying out their actions, the groups in 
question would have had a greater incentive to select alternative venues and targets.  At 
the same time, some examples of terrorism may have little to do with threats to US 
security, except in a much more indirect fashion.  The conflict in Sri Lanka, for example, 
where terrorist tactics have been employed, may pose little threat to the US unless it 
should expand to India and contribute to greater instability in South Asia. 
    
 10
One possible metric is to measure the incidence of global terrorist activity.  There 
are a number of data bases that calculate the number of terrorist incidents but there are 
serious problems with definitions and criteria for inclusion.  Defining what counts as 
terrorism as opposed to other forms of political violence carried out by non-state actors, 
defining what counts as international terrorism, including or not including actions that 
have some state sponsorship, are some of these issues.  Should each separate incident be 
given equal weight, or should there be a weighting system based, perhaps on the extent of 
damage, or maybe an assessment of the political consequences of the act?  And, counting 
terrorist actions does not give information as to what caused the number to change over 
time:  are the relevant behavioral functions that of groups that practice terrorism or of 
government agencies that seek to deter terrorist actions?  In other words, a classic 
identification problem. 
 
These problems are illustrated by the conflict in Iraq.  Data indicates that the 
incidence of terrorist violence has been increasing.  There are many definitions of 
terrorism but they usually emphasize that the primary targets of such violence are 
civilians.  Iraq has become, as of the beginning of 2007, a conflict involving three distinct 
elements.  Attacks by sub state actors on foreign military forces have usually been 
considered part of an insurgency directed against an occupying force.  Attacks by sub 
state actors against civilians thought to be affiliated with other sub state actors includes 
elements of classic definitions of terrorism, but also of civil war.  Lastly, Iraq appears to 
have attracted those who fit the more traditional definition of terrorist, and who joined the 
insurgency part to learn operational tradecraft that they feel can be applied in other 
situations.  The point is not to debate definitions, but to indicate the difficulty in defining 




The absence of conventional metrics could lead to the reliance on the opinions of experts 
and specialists in national security generally and terrorism specifically.  In one such 
exercise, a group of 100 security experts from across the political spectrum have been 
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polled twice, most recently at the end of 2006, on various questions regarding US policies 
on the GWOT.  Their conclusions, in the aggregate, are not very positive.  For example, 
75 per cent of the experts surveyed, and 50 per cent of the self-identified conservatives in 
the sample, disagreed with the statement that the US was winning the GWOT (CAP and 
Foreign Policy, 2007).   
 
At the end of 2005, the 9/11 commission released a “report card”, evaluating each 
of the components of homeland security with letter grades.  Converting these grades to a 
grade point average, and assuming each component carried equal weight, gave an overall 
GPA of 1.88, essentially a C- (Gold, 2006). 
. 
Individual experts have also given evaluations of the GWOT that suggest little 
success.  There appears to be a general consensus among specialists in universities, 
research institutes and government agencies that the terrorist groups the US is most 
concerned with, Al Qaeda and those that share its general ideology and practice, have 
been gaining in strength.  Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, formally of RAND and 
currently affiliated with Georgetown University and the West Point Combating Terrorism 
Center, recently wrote, drawing on his testimony before a committee of  the US House of 
Representatives, that Al Qaeda 
 
is not on the run but on the march.  It has regrouped and reorganized from the setbacks it 
suffered from the initial phases of the global war on terrorism….  we have more to fear 
from this resilient organization, not less (Hoffman, 2007). 
 
Specifically, Hoffman stated that 
 
Iraq [to terrorists] has been an effective means to preoccupy American military forces 
and distract U. S. attention while al-Qaida has regrouped and reorganized since the 







The most fundamental problem in attempting to answer Donald Rumsfeld’s key question 
from 2003, how do we know if we are winning the GWOT, is that there is no clear 
definition as to what winning means and therefore no clear means of identifying the 
expected benefits from allocating resources to the GWOT.  There have been attempts to 
identify progress with respect to the effectiveness of specific US actions, such as those 
involved in homeland security, and with respect to expert perceptions as to the nature of 
the threat.  These evaluations are necessarily qualitative but it is hard to see how they  
would yield a benefit-cost ratio that exceeds one.  And when costs persistently exceed 





Belasco, Amy,  “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations,” 
CRS Report for Congress, RL33110, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
Updated March 14, 2007.  www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/index.html  
 
Bilmes, Linda, “Soldiers Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan:  The Long-Term Costs of 
Providing Veterans Medical Care and Disability Benefits,” John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Papers Series RWP07-001, January 
2007.  ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/  
 
Bilmes, Linda and Joseph Stiglitz, “The Economic Costs of the Iraq War:  An Appraisal Three 
Years After the Beginning of the Conflict,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 12054, February 2006.  www.nber.org/papers/w12054.  
 
Center for American Progress (CAP) and Foreign Policy, “The Terrorism Index,” February 13,. 
2007.  www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/02/terrorism_index.html  
 
Chernick, Howard, editor, Resilient City:  The Economic Impact of 9/11, New York, Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2005.  
 
Davis, Steven J., Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “War in Iraq vs. Containment,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12092, March 2006 (original version 
2003).  www.nber.org/papers/w12092 
 
Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler, “The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies:  Vector 
Autoregression-Intervention Analysis,” American Political Science Review, vol. 87. no. 4 (1993) 
 




Enthoven, Alain C. and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?  Shaping the Defense Program, 
1961-69, New York, Harper and Row, 1971. 
 
Frey, Bruno, Simon Luechinger and Alois Stutzer, “Calculating Tragedy:  Assessing the Costs of 
Terrorism,” Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 21, no. 1 (2007), pp. 1-24. 
 
Gold, David, “Is the War on Terror ‘Worth it’?” Security Policy Working Group, Are We Safer?  
Five Years After the September 11 Attacks:  Assessing the US Security Situation and Alternatives 
for Moving Forward, The Proteus Fund, September 2006.  www.proteusfund.org/spwg  
 
Hobijn, Bart and Erick Sager, “What Has Homeland Security Cost?” Current Issues in 
Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 13, no. 2 (February 2007).  
www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues  
 
Hoffman, Bruce, “Remember Al Qaeda?  They’re baaaack,” Los Angeles Times, February 20, 
2007. 
 
Lenain, Patrick, Marcos Bonturi and Vincent Koen, “The Economic Consequences of Terrorism,” 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economics Department, Working 
Paper no. 334, July 2002.  www.oecd.org/eco  
 
Kelleher, Robert, “The Economic Costs of Terrorism,” Joint Economic Committee, United States 
Congress, May 2002.  www.house.gov/jec/terrorism/costs.pdf  
 
Kosiak, Steven M., “The Global War on Terror (GWOT):  Costs, Cost Growth and Estimating 
Funding Requirements,” Testimony, Senate Budget Committee, February 6, 2007.  
www.csbaonline.org  
 
Matthews, William, “War Helping al-Qaida Regroup, Congress Told,” Navy Times, February 15, 
2007.  
 
Murphy, Kevin M., and Robert Topel, “The Economic Value of Medical Research,” University of 
Chicago, September 1999, faculty.chicagogsb.edu/Kevin.murphy/research/Murphy&topel.pdf; 
also in Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, editors, Measuring the Gains From Medical 
Research:  An Economic Approach, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2003, ch. 2. 
 
Ohanian, Lee E., “The Macroeconomic Effects of War Finance in the United States:  World War 
II and the Korean War,” American Economic Review, 87, 1 (March 1997), pp. 23-40. 
 
Regan, Tom, “Britain Drops Phrase ‘War on Terror’,” Christian Science Monitor csmonitor.com, 
December 11, 2006.  www.csmonitor.com/2006/1211/dailyUpdate.html?3=mesdu  
 
Regan, Tom, “Polls Show Anti-American Feelings at All Time High in Muslim Countries,” 
Christian Science Monitor csmonitor.com, February 22, 2007.  
www.csmonitor.com/2007/0222/p99s01-duts.htm  
 
Roberts, Adam, “The War on Terror in Historical Perspective,” Survival, vol. 47, no. 2 (Summer 
2005), pp. 101-130. 
 
 14
Walker, David, “The Global War on Terror:  Observations on Funding, Costs and Future 
Commitments,” United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-885T, July 18, 2006.  
www.gao.gov  
 
Zycher, Benjamin, A Preliminary Benefit/Cost Framework for Counterterrorism Public 
Expenditures, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2003.  www.rand.com  
 
   
